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Abstract Because of the importance of board members’
resource provision and monitoring, a substantial body of
research has been devoted to ascertaining how directors
can be incented to perform their responsibilities. We use
social exchange theory to empirically examine how board
members’ resource provision and monitoring are affected
by their perceptions of the CEOs’ trustworthiness. Our
findings suggest that board members’ perceptions of the
CEO’s ability, benevolence, and integrity have different
effects on the board members’ resource provision and
monitoring. Our results further suggest that board mem-
bers’ governance behaviors are moderated by the board’s
performance evaluation practices.
Keywords Directors of the board  Trustworthiness 
Monitoring  Resource provision  Board evaluation
Introduction
Because CEOs may act opportunistically (Fama and Jensen
1983; Jensen and Meckling 1976), directors are called upon
to monitor the CEO on behalf of shareholders and other
stakeholders (Fama 1980). They also provide resources,
such as skills and connections to other organizations that
may enhance organizational performance (Carpenter and
Westphal 2001; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Although one
might expect that all board members will monitor and
provide resources assiduously in order to fulfill their obli-
gations, Westphal and colleagues (e.g., Westphal and Stern
2006; Westphal and Zajac 1997) suggest that the inter-
personal relationship between the CEO and directors has
important implications in terms of how well the directors
discharge their roles. Because trust affects all interpersonal
relationships (Dirks and Ferrin 2001), we focus on how a
director’s perceptions of the CEO’s trustworthiness are
expected to affect his or her resource provision and mon-
itoring behaviors.
In this paper, we therefore examine directors’ monitoring
and resource provision from a relational perspective. Spe-
cifically, we address the following research questions: (1)
how do a director’s perceptions of the CEO’s trustworthiness
affect the director’s governance behaviors, and (2) how do
the board practices (i.e., board performance evaluation
practices) moderate the relations between the director’s
trustworthiness perceptions and his or her governance
behaviors. We draw on Mayer et al. (1995) multidimensional
view of trustworthiness (i.e., ability, integrity, and benevo-
lence) to argue that a director’s perceptions of the CEO will
affect his or her resource provision and monitoring. We also
argue that board performance evaluation practices will
interact with the director’s perceptions of the CEO’s trust-
worthiness to affect the director’s behaviors. These board
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practices will likely affect the director’s incentives to fulfill
his or her board duties. Our focus in this study is at the
individual director level, rather than the board level, so we
examine the interpersonal relationships between each
director and the CEO. Our empirical findings drawn from
data from three different institutional contexts (i.e., Canada,
Singapore, Spain) show that a director’s perceptions of the
CEO’s trustworthiness are related to his or her monitoring
and resource provision.
One important contribution of this paper is that we
introduce the concept of trust between a director and the
CEO, and present a model that links the trustworthiness
perceptions to individual directors’ governance behaviors.
We empirically show that a director’s perceptions of the
different dimensions of the CEO’s trustworthiness have
different effects on the director’s behaviors. We demon-
strate that positive trustworthiness perceptions of integrity
and benevolence are associated with greater resource pro-
vision consistent with the argument that higher trust is a
positive factor that brings about greater cooperation (Dirks
and Ferrin 2001; Westphal 1999) and we show that positive
trustworthiness perceptions of integrity lead to reduced
monitoring (Langfred 2004; McEvily et al. 2003).
Regarding ability, while the results are not consistent with
our hypotheses, they show evidence of a non-linear rela-
tionship with monitoring and with resource provision,
which indicates that directors only provide resources when
the perceptions of the CEO’s ability are low. At high levels
of ability perceptions, directors seem to believe that the
CEO is able to perform his or her role appropriately
without their cooperation.
Regarding monitoring, directors monitor the CEO for
most levels of ability perceptions, and they only reduce
monitoring for extremely high levels of perceived ability.
The second contribution of our paper is that we examine
the effects of the performance evaluation practices of the
board. Although such practices are becoming increasingly
common, we still know little about the impact of such
practices on directors’ governance behaviors. Therefore,
we explain how the frequency of board evaluations (e.g., of
board members and the board’s effectiveness) may affect
the director’s monitoring and resource provision.
Directors’ Governance Behaviors
Directors of the board typically play two different yet
equally important roles: monitoring CEOs and providing
resources to them (Adams and Ferreira 2007; Hillman and
Dalziel 2003; Hillman et al. 2008). Monitoring is empha-
sized in agency theory literature, which assumes that
managers may act opportunistically (Jensen and Meckling
1976). The monitoring role therefore includes assessing the
CEO’s performance, monitoring strategy implementation,
designing CEO compensation schemes, and CEO succes-
sion planning (Boyd 1995), and it can result in the dis-
missal of the CEO for poor performance (Daily and Dalton
1995).
Resource dependence research has focused on directors’
expertise, knowledge, and skills as well as their ties to
external organizations and their effects on organizational
performance. Hillman and Dalziel (2003) argue that this
human and relational capital is the antecedent of the
directors’ resource provision activities. The focus of
resource dependence research is on the board members’
abilities rather than their motivations to provide valuable
resources to the firm (Daily et al. 2003). However,
researchers have begun to consider the directors’ resource
provision and incentives concurrently, by integrating
agency and resource dependence theories (Hillman and
Dalziel 2003). We build on these advances by considering
new antecedents of each of these behaviors.
The monitoring and resource provision roles are quali-
tatively different. While both functions demand high levels
of expertise, how the director’s expertise is utilized differs;
monitoring requires the application of expertise in infor-
mation processing and assessment, while resource provi-
sion entails offering resources (e.g., external ties and
valuable knowledge) in a concrete fashion (e.g., Pfeffer and
Salancik 1978). In this paper, following recent studies on
the role of the board that consider monitoring and resource
provision separately (Adams and Ferreira 2007; Hillman
and Dalziel 2003; Westphal 1999, Acero and Alcalde 2012),
we also regard these as two separate activities.
Trust in the Corporate Governance Context
Trust has not been widely studied in the agency theory
literature on corporate governance because agency theory
assumes a lack of trust between parties in its examination
of the risk of managerial opportunism and conflicts of
interests. In contrast, stewardship theory (Davis et al. 1997;
Donaldson 1990) and stakeholder theory (Jones 1995)
assume greater trust in management and goal alignment
between parties. By comparing two models of board gov-
ernance, one predicated on trust-based collaboration, and
the other predicated on distrust-based control (or risk of
opportunism), Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003) suggest
that greater trust-based collaboration between the CEO and
the board can lead to complacency and entrenchment,
while greater control (which signals distrust) leads to even
further control and a division between the CEO and the
board. This research suggests that the CEO-board rela-
tionship can be characterized by either the presence or
absence of trust, and trust is treated as a unidimensional
construct. Our model presents detailed mechanisms of how
varying levels of a director’s perceptions of each
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dimension of the CEO’s trustworthiness may affect the
director’s resource provision and monitoring.
Although the board functions as a group, each individual
director develops his or her own subjective perceptions of
the CEO’s trustworthiness and acts accordingly. Although
we acknowledge the effects of the board norms on indi-
vidual directors, we focus on the perceptions and behaviors
of individual directors. Trustworthiness perceptions could
potentially be measured at the board level, but it is likely
that the level of such perceptions varies significantly
among directors for various reasons, making aggregation
difficult (Kozlowski and Klein 2000). For example, some
directors may attribute poor firm performance to the CEO’s
past decisions or his/her implementation of strategy, while
others may attribute it to external factors that are beyond
the CEO’s control (e.g., the economy). These differences in
attributions may lead to very different perceptions of the
CEO’s ability. Also, some directors may have social ties
with the CEO and have interactions outside the boardroom,
which can affect how they assess the CEO’s benevolence
and integrity. We therefore contend that individual direc-
tors often have varying levels of trustworthiness percep-
tions of the CEO, and that it is more instructive to examine
the effects of these individual perceptions. We now turn to
interpersonal trust.
Trust in Interpersonal Relationships
Interpersonal interactions in organizations are generally
governed by an unspoken social exchange between indi-
viduals, and the fundamental driver of this exchange rela-
tionship is trust (Blau 1964; Holmes 1981; Homans 1958;
Chiaburu and Lim 2008). Trust usually develops over time,
as reciprocal obligations are met and as both parties have an
opportunity to observe the other’s behaviors (Blau 1964).
Rousseau et al. (1998, p. 395) define trust as ‘‘a psycho-
logical state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability
based upon positive expectations of the intentions or
behavior of another’’. Mayer et al. (1995, p. 712) similarly
define trust as the ‘‘willingness to be vulnerable to another
party when that party cannot be controlled or monitored’’.
These definitions imply that trusting another entails risk and
vulnerability. Trust is an integral component of effective
social exchanges in organizations, and has been linked to
risk-taking, task performance, and organizational citizen-
ship behaviors (Chou et al. 2008; Colquitt et al. 2007; Dirks
1999). We believe that trust must also affect the behaviors
of corporate directors.
Trust, however, is not a monolithic construct. Mayer et al.
(1995) present three separate dimensions of trustworthiness:
the other party’s ability, benevolence, and integrity. ‘‘Abil-
ity’’ (sometimes termed ability-based trust, Brockner and
Siegel 1996; cognition-based trust, McAllister 1995;
competence trust, Lui 2009; or task reliability, Sitkin and
Roth 1993) stems from a perception that the trustee has the
professional knowledge, skills and abilities to fulfill his or
her required tasks. ‘‘Integrity’’ (sometimes labeled intent-
based trust, Brockner and Siegel 1996) is defined as ‘‘per-
ception that the trustee adheres to a set of principles that the
trustor finds acceptable’’ (Mayer and Gavin 2005, p. 874).
‘‘Benevolence’’ is defined by Mayer et al. (1995) as the belief
that the trustee cares about the well-being of the potential
trustor. Previous research has tested this 3D model empiri-
cally (Aubert and Kelsey 2003; Jarvenpaa and Leidner 1999;
Yakovleva et al. 2010) and shown that the different types of
trust have different consequences (e.g., Kim et al. 2004). In
this paper, we apply the 3D model of trustworthiness to the
director–CEO relationship. In our view, a director’s per-
ceptions of the CEO’s ability, integrity, and benevolence, or
their perceptions of the CEO’s trustworthiness, will affect
the director’s likelihood of engaging in resource provision or
monitoring.
The CEO’s ability can be defined as the extent to which
his or her skills and competence enable him or her to per-
form the requisite managerial duties. Perceptions about the
CEO’s abilities are task-specific; our interest here is the
CEO’s capacity to perform his or her managerial tasks,
keeping in mind that several different skill sets and
knowledge may be required (e.g., financial, marketing,
leadership). Perceptions of the CEO’s integrity are based on
the extent to which the director believes that the CEO fol-
lows acceptable principles and values, in terms of how they
are reflected in the CEO’s honest, consistent, and open
behavior (Serva and Fuller 2004). Perceptions of the CEO’s
benevolence are determined by the extent to which the
director believes that the CEO wants to ‘‘do well by’’ the
director. Benevolence implies a specific personal relation-
ship (Mayer et al. 1995), and this suggests that the CEO may
be benevolent to one director but not to another. Our interest
lies in the CEO’s benevolence toward the focal director.
Researchers have suggested that ability is the most
objective of the three trustworthiness dimensions and is the
most important in a particular task-context, such as the
management of the firm (e.g., Serva and Fuller 2004).
Perceptions of the CEO’s ability (e.g., making strategic
decisions) are formed by observing and by gathering other
information. Because integrity and benevolence percep-
tions are assessed more subjectively, the relational context
plays a role in shaping those perceptions (Yakovleva et al.
2010). In our view, perceptions of integrity and benevo-
lence provide key information for assessing the other par-
ty’s propensity to reciprocate and to avoid acting
opportunistically or unethically (Cruz et al. 2010).
In typical exchange relationships, in which the norm of
reciprocity is critical because the ‘‘giver’’ of resources
cannot require the recipient to reciprocate (Blau 1964;
CEO Trustworthiness, Directors’ Monitoring and Resource Provision 157
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Gouldner 1960), the giver has to decide whether to risk the
recipient’s possible opportunistic behavior or non-reci-
procity. In the context of the director–CEO relationship, we
suggest that integrity and benevolence perceptions affect
how the director assesses the risk of the CEO acting
opportunistically and of his or her provision of resources
not being reciprocated by the CEO. In other words,
benevolence and integrity perceptions are more likely to
affect directors’ social exchange motivations. For example,
in response to the director’s provision of valuable market
knowledge or a linkage with an external party that may
greatly benefit the firm, the CEO may reciprocate by not
using the given resources for personal benefit, by sup-
porting the director’s appointment at another board where
the CEO sits as a director,1 or by formally acknowledging
the director’s contributions, which will enhance the direc-
tor’s reputation. Social exchange theory allows us to link
the concept of trust, which implies vulnerability and risk,
with directors’ governance behaviors.
We expect that the extent of monitoring activities will
also be affected by directors’ perceptions of the potential
risks to the company (and to the director) due to any per-
ceived deficiencies in the CEO’s trustworthiness, espe-
cially ability and integrity. As benevolence perceptions are
relevant in specific individual relationships (i.e., one can be
benevolent to one individual but not to another individual),
the potential risks and benefits are also related to specific
individuals. Shen (2003) argues that the intensity of board
monitoring will vary according to the risk of a CEO’s
opportunistic behavior. These risks may include the pos-
sibility of the CEO engaging in opportunistic or unethical
behaviors such as hiding unfavorable information or neg-
ative results, or making incompetent or even unapproved
strategic decisions. Similarly, the extent of resource pro-
vision activities will likely be affected by the potential
risks to the company due to perceived deficiencies in the
CEO’s ability and integrity. Directors may be concerned
that the CEO will act opportunistically and use the
resources provided by the director for unintended purposes.
These risks are potentially problematic to the firm and to
the directors, because the directors are responsible for
overseeing managerial decisions and protecting the inter-
ests of the firm; any negative consequences due to inap-
propriate CEO behaviors will also jeopardize the directors’
reputation. Therefore, each director is expected to use some
discretion in how he or she behaves, and it is the director’s
assessment of the CEO’s trustworthiness and the potential
risks that affect how much monitoring and resource pro-
vision the director chooses to do.
As noted by Mayer and Davis (1999), there may be
instances where an evaluation of one dimension (i.e., ability)
may differ from that of another (i.e., benevolence). We have
therefore considered the effects of a director’s perceptions of
the CEO’s ability, benevolence, and integrity on the direc-
tor’s governance behaviors separately. It is equally critical to
emphasize that each of these dimensions are evaluated along
a continuum. Although it would be rare for a CEO to possess
a very low level of ability, integrity, or benevolence because
this would result in him or her being removed, there will
necessarily be some variation in the extent to which a CEO
possess each of these qualities, relative to each other, and
relative to his or her peers. Furthermore, each of these
qualities is perceived by directors who are assessing the CEO
in relation to their own expectations of how CEOs should act.
It is important to note that while we examine the effects
of a director’s trustworthiness perceptions of a CEO, such
perceptions can be affected by how the CEO perceives the
director’s trustworthiness as well. As suggested by Ferrin
et al. (2008), the levels of trust between individuals often
evolve over time through repeated interactions. Hence, as
in many other interpersonal relationships, the director–
CEO relationship may change over time. For example, a
high level of monitoring by a director may lead to greater
social distance between the director and the CEO, which in
turn may lead to lower levels of the director’s perceptions
of the CEO’s benevolence and hence even more monitor-
ing. While these dynamic relationships are possible in the
director–CEO relationship, our study focuses on the effects
of trustworthiness perceptions on the director’s behaviors
because our interest in this study is to extend the trust
research, which often examines the relationships between
trust and cooperative and monitoring behaviors in other
work settings, to the relationship within the boardroom.2
The Effect of Ability Perceptions on Monitoring
and Resource Provision
Because the CEO’s strategic decisions can have important
implications for organizational performance, it is reason-
able to expect that board members will assess the CEO’s
ability carefully. Among the three dimensions of trust-
worthiness, the ability perceptions are more likely to
invoke concerns about firm performance rather than social
exchange risks because, as we discussed, the ability is the
most objective measure among the three dimensions (Serva
and Fuller 2004) and will likely have a direct impact on
performance. We argue that a director’s perceptions of the
1 In the United States, the CEO-chair can no longer support a
director’s reappointment, due to the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, but they
may still facilitate his or her appointment at another board.
2 Longitudinal dyadic data or experimental study are required to
examine the dynamic relationships between directors and CEO and it
will be difficult to get matched data from directors and CEO or
conduct an experiment with directors and CEO as participants.
158 E. B. Del Brio et al.
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CEO’s ability will have a negative relation with his or her
monitoring, with greater monitoring activity occurring
when the CEO has especially low levels of perceived
ability. With positive perceptions of the CEO’s ability, the
director will be more likely to risk being vulnerable to the
CEO’s actions and decisions, because he or she has con-
fidence that the CEO is capable of performing the neces-
sary managerial duties. This logic is consistent with the
trust research that treats trust as a substitute of monitoring.
Therefore, the director may allow the CEO greater dis-
cretion and autonomy, and de-emphasize monitoring and
control (Langfred 2004; McEvily et al. 2003).
In contrast, if a director has negative perceptions of the
CEO’s ability to perform the required duties, he or she will
likely not feel comfortable taking a risk by granting great
autonomy to the CEO; the director would be more likely to,
once again, intensify his or her monitoring of the CEO
(Bromiley and Cummings 1995). One possible outcome of
intense monitoring is CEO dismissal; keeping an incom-
petent CEO would have potentially detrimental effects on
organizational performance and also increase the risks to
the individual directors (e.g., litigation). In cases where the
lack of ability is not so severe as to merit termination (e.g.,
small deficiencies in some areas are overshadowed by
significant strengths in more important areas), or if termi-
nation is not possible (e.g., family owned firms), the
director will provide resources in order to reduce the risks
caused by the CEO’s difficulties in managing the organi-
zation. In this case, the director would protect his or her
own interests (e.g., prevent damage to his or her reputation
from being associated with a poorly performing organiza-
tion). It is also possible that the director would have ethical
qualms about not supporting the CEO with resources, given
the obligation to help the organization to succeed.
The effect of directors’ perceptions of the CEO’s ability
on the director’s resource provision activities is expected to
be similar. We argue that a director’s perceptions of the
CEO’s ability will predict his or her resource provision
activities, with higher levels of resources being provided to
CEOs with low levels of perceived ability. The CEO’s use
of the provided resources will potentially improve firm
performance, thereby helping to enhance firm performance
as well as the director’s reputation. The director would
therefore be motivated to provide more resources when his
or her perceptions of the CEO’s ability are positive. We
therefore propose:
Hypothesis 1a A director’s perceptions of the CEO’s
ability have a negative relation to his or her monitoring
activities; perceptions of low ability are related to more
monitoring.
Hypothesis 1b A director’s perceptions of the CEO’s
ability have a negative relation to his or her resource
provision activities; perceptions of low ability are related to
more resource provision.
The Effect of Integrity Perceptions on Monitoring
and Resource Provision
Although the CEO’s ability is an important determinant of
directors’ governance behaviors, it is equally important to
consider the CEO’s integrity. Negative perceptions of the
CEO’s integrity may raise questions as to whether the CEO
intends to act appropriately and honestly (Rousseau et al.
1998), especially since people tend to weigh negative
information more heavily than positive information, when
assessing others’ moral character (Snyder and Stukas
1999). The perceived lack of integrity of the CEO can also
have negative performance implications to the firm, as the
CEO’s unethical behavior may lead to some negative
consequences. A director’s negative perceptions of the
CEO’s integrity may therefore incline the director to place
more emphasis on monitoring. Perceptions that the CEO’s
integrity is adequate will provide reasonable reassurance
that the CEO will act in a manner consistent with the
director’s own principles and values. Hence, the director
may be willing to risk being more vulnerable to the actions
of the CEO, and engage in less monitoring, keeping in
mind that monitoring is time consuming and at times dif-
ficult. Further, as noted by Gulati and Westphal (1999),
monitoring behaviors have the potential to create social
distance between a CEO and a director. Hence, from a
social exchange perspective, the director is less motivated
to intensify his or her monitoring when she or he perceives
that the CEO has a high level of integrity.
The director’s perceptions of the CEO’s integrity may
also affect his or her resource provision activities. As dis-
cussed earlier, relational context comes into play when one
assesses another’s integrity. The director’s positive per-
ceptions of the CEO’s integrity may lead to the director’s
expectation of a reciprocal exchange relationship with the
CEO. When resources are provided, the director may
expect that the CEO with high integrity will respond and
reciprocate in an honest, open, and consistent manner
(Serva and Fuller 2004). For example, the CEO may
respond by being forthcoming with negative or sensitive
information, or by sharing more information with the
director (Dirks and Ferrin 2001; Nahapiet and Goshal
1998). This kind of interaction creates a positive reci-
procity in their social exchange relationship (Blau 1964;
Molm 1994). When a director has positive perceptions of
the CEO’s integrity, then, the director’s resource provision
role is likely to be enhanced. On the other hand, negative
perceptions may lead the director to question whether his
or her resources would be used appropriately and honestly
by the CEO. We therefore propose the following:
CEO Trustworthiness, Directors’ Monitoring and Resource Provision 159
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Hypothesis 2a A director’s perceptions of the CEO’s
integrity have a negative relation to his or her monitoring
activities; negative perceptions of integrity are related to
more monitoring.
Hypothesis 2b A director’s perceptions of the CEO’s
integrity have a positive relation to his or her resource
provision activities; positive perceptions of integrity are
related to more resource provision.
The Effect of Benevolence Perceptions on Monitoring
and Resource Provision
As in any personal relationship, including those between a
principal (i.e., a director who represents shareholders) and
an agent (i.e., the CEO), perceptions of the other party’s
benevolence, or the belief that the agent cares about the
well-being of the principal (Mayer et al. 1995), should
affect how one perceives the risk of opportunism (Cruz
et al. 2010). When one perceives that the other party is
benevolent toward oneself, one can expect that the other
party will not act opportunistically or harm one’s interests;
benevolence is the opposite of opportunism (Cruz et al.
2010; Schoorman et al. 2007; Yakovleva et al. 2010).
Perceptions that the CEO has an adequate level of benev-
olence, then, may lead the director to lower his or her
monitoring activities, because high levels of safeguards
against opportunistic behaviors may not be necessary
(McEvily et al. 2003). Greater monitoring can also create
social distance and hence, the director who perceives the
CEO to be benevolent will not likely wish to risk the social
relationship with the CEO through intense monitoring.
A director’s perception of the CEO’s benevolence, or the
belief that the CEO cares about the director’s well-being
(Mayer et al. 1995), will also affect his or her resource pro-
vision. Positive perceptions of benevolence signal that the
CEO is willing to ‘‘do well by’’ the director. From a social
exchange perspective, positive benevolence perceptions
suggest that the CEO would not take advantage of the director
and would respond positively to the director’s resource pro-
vision. A director’s positive perceptions of the CEO’s
benevolence, then, will lead the director to provide a benev-
olent CEO with resources, in the interests of promoting a
positive relationship with an individual who may be disposed
to reciprocate such treatment. However, in cases where the
director’s perceptions of the CEO’s benevolence are negative,
there are few incentives for the director to provide resources to
the CEO. There would be high levels of uncertainty about
whether this resource provision would be reciprocated by the
CEO; as a result, the director would expose him/herself to a
high risk of non-reciprocity. We therefore propose that:
Hypothesis 3a A director’s perceptions of the CEO’s
benevolence have a negative relation to his or her
monitoring activities; positive perceptions of benevolence
are related to less monitoring.
Hypothesis 3b A director’s perceptions of the CEO’s
benevolence have a positive relation to his or her resource
provision activities; positive perceptions of benevolence
are related to more resource provision.
The Effects of Board Performance Evaluation Practices
We have thus far focused on individual directors’ subjective
assessments of the CEO, and how these affect the directors’
governance behaviors. However, board members’ perfor-
mance is under increasing scrutiny and an increasing number
of boards are conducting peer assessments and using them
for the performance evaluations of individual directors.
Because the board functions as a group (Golden and Zajac
2001) and individual board member’s behaviors are con-
stantly assessed by other members, it is important to consider
the effects of such board practices on individual directors’
behaviors. Although each board has its own expectations
about how much effort each director should expend to per-
form his or her board duties (Lorsch and Macliver 1989;
Zona and Zattoni 2007), the presence of such board practices
will likely increase directors’ monitoring and resource pro-
vision, because they will be more aware of negative conse-
quences that may accrue to a failure to perform their duties
adequately. We therefore make the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4 The presence of board performance eval-
uation practices is positively related to a director’s moni-
toring and resource provision.
In terms of the moderating effects of board performance
evaluation practices, it is likely that they will positively
interact with a director’s perceptions of the trustworthiness
of the CEO. Because we predict that the board performance
evaluation practices have positive effects on the director’s
monitoring and resource provision, we expect that the
presence of such practices will further enhance the likeli-
hood that directors will monitor and provide resources. We
therefore present the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5 The presence of board performance evalua-
tion practices positively moderates the relationship between a
director’s perceptions of the CEO’s ability, benevolence, and
integrity and his or her monitoring and resource provision.
Method
Sample and Data Collection
Our study focuses on a sample of 160 outside directors
coming from three different countries: Spain, Singapore and
160 E. B. Del Brio et al.
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Canada. Data were collected through an anonymous survey
questionnaire sent to outside directors of major organiza-
tions in the three countries. We chose these geographical
contexts to enhance generalizability of our findings. These
countries have different cultural and institutional charac-
teristics. However, the official responsibilities of the board
are very similar. Our target population includes directors of
both profit and non-profit organizations. Although the rel-
ative emphasis of the board activities is arguably slightly
different between these two types of organizations, board
members are still expected to monitor management and
provide resources. Therefore, our study focuses on behav-
iors of the director as a profession.
The survey was undertaken from October 2009 to March
2010. Formal agreements were obtained when possible with
directors associations in the different countries in order to
facilitate the implementation of the study. It was especially
effective in Spain where a tight relationship was established
with the Institute of Directors of Spain (IC-A). Members of
these associations and institutes include directors of most
major firms, family firms and non-profit organizations in the
country. A cover letter was included in all cases explaining
the relevance of the study and survey feedback was prom-
ised to be delivered both to the associations and to all those
directors who provided us with their email addresses. The
first reminder was sent after 3 weeks after and the second
reminder was sent 6 weeks after the fist reminder. After
removing responses with missing values, the final number
of responses for the three countries was thus 160 observa-
tions: 60 responses from Singapore, 70 responses from
Canada, and 30 usable responses from Spain.
Of these 160 respondents who indicated where their
company was registered, 44 % were Canadian, 38 % were
from Singapore, and 18 % were from Spain. Of the 72
respondents who indicated their gender, most were male
(71 %). In our sample, the average age of the 92 respondents
who indicated it was 56. This is comparable with the average
age of boards of directors in Singapore (50; Quah 2006),
Spain (59; Spencer Stuart Board Index 2010), and Canada
(61; Spencer Stuart Board Index 2008). The average length of
time that our respondents had served on their boards was
7.8 years, which is slightly over the average board tenure of
directors in Spain and Canada (5 years; Spencer Stuart Board
Index Canada and Spain; 7 years for Singapore). Most of our
respondents had either Master’s or undergraduate-level
education. Directors in our sample hailed from a variety of
functional backgrounds, including marketing/sales, finance,
research and development, engineering, operations, and law.
Survey Design
Due to the nature of directors’ responsibilities and the sensitive
topics covered by our questionnaire, a low rate of response was
a priori expected. Thus, several response facilitation approa-
ches as well as N-Bias techniques were applied. By following
Rogelberg and Stanton (2007); Randall and Fernandes (1991)
and Podsakoff et al. (2003), several mechanisms were applied
to prevent a substantive impact of a low response rate on the
conclusions and simultaneously reduce the impact of common
method bias: (i) the survey was conducted anonymously; (ii) a
cover letter was included explaining the importance of the
study for its implications on corporate governance in the
international context; (iii) we used pre-notification and
reminder notes several days before and after the first release;
(iv) we used both mail and email copies to provide response
opportunities with our respondents; and (v) survey feedback
was promised to be delivered by email to all those directors
who provide us with their email addresses.
Directors were asked to rate on a seven-point Likert
scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) to
agree or disagree with our statements. We carefully
designed the questionnaire to prevent an excessive length
(which reduces the likelihood of response) and to avoid
item ambiguity (which will exacerbate common method
biases). The different cultural characteristics of directors
from each country were also taken into account when
translating the questionnaire English into Spanish in order
to ensure a correct and polite approach to the director. A
pretest on several directors helped to achieve this aim.
Measures
Independent Variables
Each dimension of trustworthiness was measured with a
scale developed by Mayer and Davis (1999) but adapted
for the board context. Benevolence was measured with four
items, including ‘‘The CEO is very concerned about my
welfare’’. The reliability for this measure was acceptable
(a = .85). Integrity was measured with six items, including
‘‘I know the CEO will stick to his/her word,’’ and the scale
reliability for this measure was high (a = .90). The ability
measure consisted of seven items, including ‘‘The CEO is
very capable of performing his/her job’’. The reliability for
this measure was high (a = .92).
Board performance evaluation practices were assessed
with four items: (1) We conduct regular board evaluations;
(2) We conduct evaluations of the board chair; (3) We
evaluate fellow board members; (4) These evaluations are
used frequently. The internal consistency of this measure
was high (a = .94).
Dependent Variables
Resource provision was measured with five items devel-
oped by Westphal (1999) but adapted for board members.
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A representative item is ‘‘I act as a ‘sounding board’ to the
CEO on strategic issues’’. The reliability of this measure
was reasonable (a = .74). Monitoring was measured with
four items as developed by Westphal (1999) and adapted
for our context; a representative item is ‘‘I monitor the
CEO’s strategic decision making’’. The reliability of this
measure was also reasonable (a = .70).
Control Variables
Because participants hailed from different countries, it was
important to control for the influence of cultural differences
on the participants’ governance behaviors (i.e., monitoring
and resource provision). We therefore used country dum-
mies to identify cultural differences. Thus, we constructed
two dummy variables C1 and C2, where C1 is a dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 for Canadian firms, and 0,
otherwise; and C2 is a dummy variable that takes the value
of 1 for Singaporean firms, and 0, otherwise. We only
incorporated two dummy variables to control for the three
countries in order to prevent the well-know dummy tramp
effect. We also controlled for whether the participant served
as a board member on a for-profit or non-profit organization.
The estimated models are as shown in Eqs. 1 and 2.
Moniti ¼ b0 þ b1Ini þ b2Abi þ b3Bnvi þ b4BPi þ b5Pri
þ b6C1i þ b7C2i þ b8In  BPi þ b9Ab  BPi
þ b10Bnv  BPi þ uit ð1Þ
RPi ¼ b0 þ b1Ini þ b2Abi þ b3Bnvi þ b4BPi þ b5Pri
þ b6Indi þ b7Pwdi þ b8In  BPi þ b9Ab  BPi
þ b10Bnv  BPi þ uit ð2Þ
where Moniti stands for Monitoring, RPi stands for
resource provision, Ini stands for integrity, Abi stands for
ability, Bnvi stands for benevolence, BPi stands for board
practices, Pr is a dummy variable that takes the value of 0
for non-profit firms, and 0 otherwise; and C1 and C2 stands
for our country dummies.
Data Analysis
Descriptive statistics, correlations, and internal consistency
reliability estimates for the measures are presented in
Table 1. Figure 1 shows the histograms for dependent and
independent variables.
To determine the predictive power of the independent
variables on the different governance behaviors, hierar-
chical multiple regressions were performed separately for
monitoring and resource provision. These results are shown
separately in Tables 2 and 3, respectively. In each hierar-
chical regression, control variables (for-profit organization
and country dummies) were entered in the first step, and
the primary-independent variables were entered in the
second step. Interaction effects were tested by forming
composite terms and assessing the incremental variance
explained (Aiken and West 1991).
Results
Our hypotheses relating to the effects of ability on a
director’s governance behaviors were not supported. Our
first hypothesis (H1a), which suggests a negative relation
between a director’s perceptions of the CEO’s ability and
his or her monitoring activities, was not supported, since we
did not find a positive relationship. Similar results were
attained for Hypothesis 1b, which refers to ability and
resource provision. Because of the unexpected results, we
carefully examined the scatter plots to further investigate
these results. As the scatter plots appeared to suggest the
presence of a nonlinear relationship, we tested new versions
of Models 1 and 2, where we included the square term of
Table 1 Descriptive statistics, correlations, and internal consistencies
S. no. Me SD Max Minx 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Ability 5.77 1.17 1 7 .92
2. Integrity 5.12 .97 1 7 .78** .90
3. Benevolence 4.52 1.17 1 7 .44** .44** .85
4. Board Practices 4.41 1.78 1 7 .17* .18* .04 .93
5. Resource Provision 5.32 1.31 1 7 .38** .44** .38** .25** .74
6. Monitoring 5.02 1.28 1 7 .33** .33** .24** .43** .70** .70
7. For-profit 2.31 1.16 1 4 .08 .06 .01 .24** .04 .06
8. Country 1 0.45 4.99 0 1 .02 .00 .15 .06 .06 .24** .26**
9. Country 2 0.63 4.82 0 1 .02 .00 .14 .05 .07 .25** .27** .13*
Internal consistencies are indicated in bold on the diagonal
Me stands for Mean, SD for standard deviation, M for maximum, and Mi for minimum
* p \ .05, ** p \ .001
162 E. B. Del Brio et al.
123
ability, considering the likelihood of a nonlinear relation-
ship. We refer to these models, as Models 1b and 2b, and are
shown in Eqs. 3 and 4, respectively.
Moniti ¼ b0 þ b1Ini þ b2Abi þ b3Bnvi þ b4BPi þ b5Pri
þ b6C1i þ b7C2i þ b8Ab2i þ b9In  BPi
þ b10Ab2  BPi þ b11Bnv  BPi þ uit ð3Þ
RPi ¼ b0 þ b1Ini þ b2Abi þ b3Bnvi þ b4BPi þ b5Pri
þ b6C1i þ b7C2i þ b8Ab2it þ b9Ini  BPi
þ b10Abi2  BPi þ b11Bnvi  BPi þ uit
ð4Þ
where Ab2
i
stands for squared ability, and the rest of the
variables are defined as in Models 1 and 2.
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According to the new estimations and regarding moni-
toring, we found a quadratic relation between a director’s
perceptions of the CEO’s ability and his or her monitoring
activities, as depicted in Fig. 2. The quadratic function has
a break-point, which is a maximum, at 6.040, which indi-
cates that the perception of values of ability under 6.040
will lead to higher levels of monitoring (b = 1.945,
p \ .001) but directors exercise less control for very high
level of perceived CEO’s ability (b = -.161, p \ .001),
thus reducing monitoring, as proposed in Hypothesis 1a.
Regarding resource provision, we also identified a qua-
dratic relationship suggesting that a director’s lower per-
ceptions of the CEO’s ability would motivate higher
resource provision, but this behavior diminishes when the
director’s perceptions of CEO ability are high (b = 1.811,
p \ .001; b = -.183, p \ .001). The function also has a
maximum, located in point 4.948, as shown in Fig. 3.
Therefore, directors diminish their resource provision only
for very high level of perceived CEO’s ability.
The hypotheses relating to the effects of CEO integrity
on a director’s behaviors received mixed support.
Hypothesis 2a, which proposes a negative relation between
a director’s perceptions of the CEO’s integrity and his or
her monitoring activities, was supported (b = -.763;
p \ .001). Hypothesis 2b, which predicts that a director’s
perceptions of the CEO’s integrity would positively affect
his or her resource provision activities, was supported in
the first step of the model (b = .394; p \ .01), although the
effects are diluted in the last model (b = -.183; p [ .05).
Regarding benevolence, only Hypothesis 3b was sup-
ported; we found that a director’s perceptions of the CEO’s
benevolence positively affected his or her resource provi-
sion (b = .161; p \ .01). However, hypothesis 3a was not
supported; a director’s perceptions of the CEO’s benevo-
lence did not seem to affect the extent of monitoring
(b = .145; p [ .05).
Our fourth hypothesis on the effects of board perfor-
mance evaluation practices on board members’ resource
provision and monitoring behaviors, received mixed sup-
port; board performance evaluation practices were posi-
tively related to directors’ resource provision (b = .258;
p \ .001), but not to monitoring (b = -.268; p [ .05). The
Table 2 Regression results for trustworthiness, board practices and monitoring: Model 1 (Eq. 1):Moniti ¼ b0 þ b1Ini þ b2Abiþ
b3Bnvi þ b4BPi þ b5Pri þ b6C1i þ b7C2i þ b8In  BPi þ b9Ab  BPi þ b10Bnv  BPi þ uit; Model 1b (Eq. 3):Moniti ¼ b0 þ b1Iniþ
b2Abi þ b3Bnvi þ b4BPi þ b5Pri þ b6C1i þ b7C2i þ b8Ab2i þ b9Ini  BPi þ b10Abi2  BPi þ b11Bnv  BPi þ uit
Monitoring
Step 1
Coeff.
Step 2
Coeff.
Step 3
Coeff.
Step 4
Coeff.
Constant 5.555*** 2.290*** -.093 1.771
Control variable
For-profit -.170** -.064** -.064 -.046*
Country 1 .207* -.022 -.063 -007
Country 2 -.600** -.775** -.695** -.583***
Independent variables
Integrity .143 -.099 -.763***
Ability .140* 1.753*** 1.945***
Benevolence .096 .110** .145
Board Practices .278*** .293*** -.268
Curvilinear effects
Ability2 -.168*** -.161***
Interaction effects
Integrity 9 BP .148**
Ability2 9 BP -.005
Benevolence 9 BP -.009
R2 .077 .583 .678 .688
DR2 .077 .263 .119 .014
F 4.315** 11.124*** 15.944*** 12.039***
Durbin–Watson 2.017
Wald test 22.301
Non-standardized coefficients are shown
* p \ .05, ** p \ .01, *** p \ .001
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fifth hypothesis, which predicts moderating effects of board
performance evaluation practices on the relation between a
director’s perceptions of the CEO’s ability, benevolence,
and integrity and his or her monitoring and resource pro-
vision behaviors, was also partially supported. The board
performance evaluation practices interacted with the
director’s perceptions of the CEO’s integrity when depict-
ing monitoring (b = .148; p \ .01), but other relations
were non-significant either for monitoring or for resource
provision. Finally, in order to analyze the impact of cultural
differences on our results, we run Wald tests for Models 3
and 4, as shown in Tables 2 and 3. In both cases, we found
that the inclusion of country dummy variables increases the
explanatory power of both models, thus supporting the
relevance of cultural differences on our analysis.
Discussion
Unlike much of the existing research on board governance
that focuses on how to incent or motivate directors to
perform effectively, we have examined directors’ behav-
iors, specifically, focusing on how directors’ perceptions of
different facets of a CEO’s trustworthiness (i.e., ability,
integrity, benevolence) affect their resource provision and
monitoring behaviors. Our findings suggest that directors’
behaviors are influenced by their trustworthiness percep-
tions of the CEO and that different trustworthiness aspects
have different mechanisms that impact directors’ behav-
iors. Our study has also considered how the existence of
board performance evaluation practices can affect the
directors’ governance, and how they can moderate the
relations between the directors’ perceptions of the CEO’s
trustworthiness and their monitoring and resource provi-
sion. Our results are highly generalizable; this research was
conducted with an international sample (e.g., directors on
boards in Canada, Spain, and Singapore), and we con-
trolled for cultural differences (country dummies) that may
affect board evaluation practices and typical governance
behaviors.
Because CEOs and board members do not perform their
duties in vacuum without any interpersonal relationships,
Table 3 Regression results for trustworthiness, board practices and resource provision: Model 2 (Eq. 2): RPi ¼ b0 þ b1Ini þ b2Abiþ
b3Bnvi þ b4BPi þ b5Pri þ b6Indi þ b7Pwdi þ b8In  BPi þ b9Ab  BPi þ b10Bnv  BPi þ uit; Model 2b (Eq. 4):RPi ¼ b0 þ b1Ini þ b2Abiþ
b3Bnvi þ b4BPi þ b5Pri þ b6C1i þ b7C2i þ b8Ab2it þ b9In  BPi þ b10Ab2  BPi þ b11Bnv  BPi þ uit
Resource provision
Step 1
Coeff.
Step 2
Coeff.
Step 3
Coeff.
Step 4
Coeff.
Constant 5.769*** 2.001** -.443 .943
Control variables
For-profit -.103 -.024*** -.026 -.021
Country 1 -.130 -.107 -.150 -.115
Country 2 -.415 -.402 -.333 -.266*
Independent variables
Integrity .394** .159 -.183
Ability .021* 1.654*** 1.811***
Benevolence .177*** .192*** .161**
Board practices .145** .162*** .258*
Curvilinear effects
Ability2 -.171*** -.183***
Interaction effects
Integrity 9 BP .076
Ability2 9 BP .000
Benevolence 9 BP .007
R2 .014 .283 .400 .407
DR2 .755 14.233 29.603 .515
F .755*** 8.566*** 12.606*** 9.220***
Durbin–Watson 1.902
Wald test 19.5***
Non-standardized coefficients are shown
* p \ .05, ** p \ .01, *** p \ .001
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we believe that our focus on the interpersonal dimensions
of these relationships presents a realistic picture. In
essence, it is too simplistic to state that CEOs should be
‘‘trustworthy’’. By empirically examining how each ele-
ment of trustworthiness affects directors’ governance
behaviors, we are able to show the extent to which indi-
vidual directors will monitor and provide resources.
Interestingly, depending on the specific profile of the
CEO’s trustworthiness, the director may monitor or pro-
vide resources, but not necessarily do both.
According to our findings, high levels of trustworthiness
perceptions of CEO’s integrity lead to less monitoring by
the director. Contrary to prior research (Creed and Miles
1996; Langfred 2004), we did not find a negative rela-
tionship between CEO’s ability and monitoring. Instead,
the scatter plots suggested that a curvilinear effect may
describe this relationship better. In fact, we detected a
nonlinear relationship for monitoring, which indicates that
lower levels of trustworthiness perceptions of ability lead
to higher levels of monitoring and that monitoring
decreases for a very high level of CEO’s ability. This
finding is not consistent with the prior research on the
impact of trust which shows that higher trust leads to lower
monitoring (Langfred 2004) suggesting that trustworthi-
ness perceptions and monitoring are not necessarily simple
substitutes of each other in the board context. One possible
interpretation of this result is that directors consider man-
agerial monitoring as their primary duty and higher CEO’s
ability motivates those directors to perform their monitor-
ing task. As for resource provision, our results show that
higher levels of trustworthiness perceptions of integrity and
benevolence lead the director to provide more resources
consistent with the prior trust research. Our study thus
extends a growing body of literature which suggests that
the assessment of someone’s ability is not the only
important determinant of whether one will forge a reci-
procal working relationship with a potential partner
(Casciaro and Lobo 2008a, b). We also found a quadratic
relationship between CEO’s ability and resource provision,
which indicates that directors reduce their resource provi-
sions when their perceptions of the CEO’s ability are high.
The results of our study also suggest that the antecedents
of monitoring and resource provision are different; moni-
toring has a negative relationship with directors’ percep-
tions of CEO trustworthiness in terms of integrity, and
resource provision is directly and positively related to the
director’s perceptions of CEO benevolence and ability, but
not with integrity. It is possible that directors’ perceptions
of the importance of these behaviors may account for these
differences. Resource provision may be seen as a personal
favor to the CEO and hence social exchange incentives
play a more important role, whereas monitoring may be
seen as a less discretionary behavior and hence lower levels
of CEO integrity which may cause damages to the firm
invokes the director’s motivation to monitor more. Because
monitoring and resource provision are both important to
the effective functioning of the board and the organization,
future research can examine additional antecedents of
resource provision behaviors, with particular attention to
any possible barriers.
We have also shown that while the board performance
evaluation practices directly affect only resource provision
by directors, these practices interact with a director’s per-
ceptions of the CEO’s integrity to increase monitoring.
Essentially, directors are more likely to provide resources
to the CEO when the board members are evaluated fre-
quently and effectively, and when the directors’ percep-
tions of the CEO’s integrity motivate them to reciprocate
based on social exchange norms. However, we did not find
any interaction effect with the CEO’s ability and benevo-
lence. Further, those practices did not interact with the
trustworthiness perceptions to enhance resource provision.
These findings suggest that board evaluation practices may
be an effective way to heighten directors’ awareness of
6.040
Low Ability High Ability
Fig. 2 Quadratic relationship between monitoring & ability
Low Ability High Ability
4.948 
Fig. 3 Quadratic relationship between resource provision & ability
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their resource provision role when there is a social
exchange relationship between the CEO and directors.
Also, the director’s incentive to monitor the CEO and the
effect of board performance evaluation practices are sep-
arate and each has an independent effect on the director’s
behavior. Importantly, the mere presence of these board
evaluation practices does not appear to influence the board
members’ behaviors. Future research can examine if there
are any specific board performance evaluation practices
that are especially useful in this regard.
One of the important contributions of this study is that it
is the first to examine the effects of trust on directors’
resource provision and monitoring. This study, therefore,
presents an important step toward understanding the impact
of interpersonal factors on how board members behave in
the boardroom. Future research can build on this work by
examining potential antecedents and moderators of this
relationship. For example, social ties (Granovetter 1973;
Westphal 1999) between a board member and the CEO
may reduce the board member’s likelihood of monitoring,
and they may cause the CEO to act more benevolently,
thereby increasing the board member’s likelihood of pro-
viding more resources. Whereas this study has focused on
the role of trust, it would be interesting to examine other
important social exchange factors such as interpersonal
justice (Masterson et al. 2000), especially from the CEO, in
predicting board members’ behaviors.
While this study and many others have focused on uni-
directional relationships between a trustor and trustee, trust
perceptions between two parties are sometimes interde-
pendent (Ferrin et al. 2007, 2008; Yakovleva et al. 2010).
As such, it would be interesting to consider how a director’s
governance behaviors may be interpreted by the CEO. By
observing how a director monitors, (e.g., how the director
processes information and the types of questions he or she
asks), the CEO can assess the director’s ability. Increased
monitoring may not necessarily lead the CEO to develop a
positive perception of the director’s ability, because intense
monitoring is not always necessary and can even be coun-
terproductive. Intense monitoring, which signals low trust,
may actually damage the relationship between the CEO and
director by fostering negative feelings and suspicion
(Cialdini 1996; McEvily et al. 2003). The CEO’s assess-
ment of the director’s monitoring, then, would be based on
both amount and the quality of such behaviors. A director’s
monitoring can also provide opportunities for the CEO to
observe and assess the director’s integrity, because his or
her monitoring may reveal a set of principles that are being
used to evaluate the CEO’s strategic plans and performance.
If the CEO believes that the director monitors his or her
performance in an honest, fair, and consistent manner, then
the CEO is more likely to have a positive perception of the
director’s integrity.
A director’s resource provision activities may also pro-
vide opportunities for the CEO to assess his or her ability,
by observing the quantity and quality of resources are
provided, which may signal the quality of the director’s
human and social capital (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978;
Hillman and Dalziel 2003). If the director gives useful
professional advice or business ties with a powerful sup-
plier, this may enhance the CEO’s perceptions of the
director’s ability. A director’s resource provision activities
may also signal his or her willingness to help the CEO, and
therefore be interpreted as a proxy for the director’s
benevolence. Further research can investigate these possi-
bilities further.
Just as the director’s perceptions of the CEO’s trust-
worthiness affect the director’s governance behaviors, it
would be interesting to examine how the CEO’s percep-
tions of the director’s trustworthiness affect the CEO’s
behaviors. As noted by Ferrin et al. (2007, 2008), when one
party holds positive perceptions of the other’s trustwor-
thiness, he or she often behaves cooperatively, which in
turn affects the other party’s perceptions. When the CEO
has positive perceptions of a director’s trustworthiness, it
would be interesting to examine if he or she then becomes
more willing to work with the director by, for example,
disclosing useful but sensitive information or by proac-
tively seeking the director’s advice and resources. Because
positive perceptions of integrity and benevolence indicate
low risks of opportunism and non-reciprocity (Cruz et al.
2010; Ferrin et al. 2008), the CEO’s positive perceptions of
a director’s trustworthiness may lead the CEO to exhibit
trustworthy behaviors toward the director. Longitudinal
research that captures how both CEO and directors’ per-
ceptions of the other’s trustworthiness evolve over time is
therefore warranted.
Despite the many contributions of this study, some
limitations must be acknowledged. First, our study relied
on self-report data. However, it should be noted that the
board members’ perceptions of the CEO’s trustworthiness
as well as their monitoring behaviors would be difficult for
a third party to assess. Second, the sample in our study was
relatively small. In consequence, we were precluded from
using structural equation modeling, which would have
taken into account correlations between our independent
variables as well as measurement error. Third, our data was
not longitudinal, which prevents us from making more
definite claims about the causal relations between the
variables in our hypothesized model. However, we should
emphasize the difficulty in surveying active members of
boards of directors; this population is limited in number,
busy, and not readily incented to complete surveys, even
for academic research.
Advocates of ‘‘good’’ corporate governance typically
ground their arguments on agency theoretic logic, and call
CEO Trustworthiness, Directors’ Monitoring and Resource Provision 167
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for a greater number of independent directors on the board.
However, because there is limited research on the personal
interactions between board members and CEOs, or within
the board itself, we still do not know much about the
effects of interpersonal dynamics on board governance
(Hambrick et al. 2008). Insight into the interpersonal
aspects of board member relationships provides us with a
more nuanced understanding of the underlying forces that
may affect the quality of the decisions being made. As
such, it behooves us to continue to study the governance
behaviors of corporate directors; the financial health and
sound governance of businesses depends on it.
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